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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Portland Generating Station (―Portland‖) is a 427-
megawatt, coal-fired, electricity generating plant located in 
Upper Mount Bethel Township in Northampton County, 
Pennsylvania.  Portland is directly across the Delaware River 
within 500 feet of Knowlton Township in Warren County, 
New Jersey.  The EPA has found that Portland emits sulfur 
dioxide in amounts that significantly interfere with the control 
of air pollution across state borders.  Sulfur dioxide is a toxic 
air pollutant that endangers life and health, causing burning of 
the nose and throat, difficulty breathing, and obstruction of 
5 
 
the lungs and airways.1  Because of its location, Portland‘s 
sulfur dioxide emissions travel directly across the river into 
areas of New Jersey.  In response to a petition under the 
Clean Air Act, the EPA issued a rule imposing direct limits 
on Portland‘s emissions and a schedule of restrictions to 
reduce its contribution to air pollution within three years.  
GenOn REMA, LLC (―GenOn‖), the owner and operator of 
Portland, challenges the EPA‘s rule as inconsistent with the 
agency‘s authority under the Clean Air Act and as arbitrary 
and capricious.  We will uphold the rule and deny GenOn‘s 
petition for review.  
 
I. BACKGROUND    
A. Statutory Background  
The Clean Air Act authorizes the Environmental 
Protection Agency (the ―EPA‖) to establish air quality 
standards and empowers the states to achieve those standards. 
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. EPA, 836 F.2d 777, 779 
(3d Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted).  This ―cooperative 
federalism‖ structure is a defining feature of the statute.  
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1046 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001).  The Clean Air Act gives the EPA authority to 
establish national ambient air quality standards (―NAAQS‖) 
for certain pervasive air pollutants to protect public health and 
welfare.  42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409.  Under Section 110 of the 
                                            
1 See Sulfur Dioxide FAQS, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
AND DISEASE REGISTRY, (1999), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ 
tfacts116.pdf. 
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Clean Air Act, states are required to implement NAAQS 
through state implementation plans (―SIPs‖) that specify how 
NAAQS will be achieved and maintained in the state.  Id. §§ 
7407, 7410.  States must adopt and submit SIPs to the EPA 
that provide for the ―implementation, maintenance, and 
enforcement‖ of NAAQS within their borders no later than 
three years after the EPA promulgates a particular NAAQS.2  
Id. § 7410(a)(1).   
 
If the EPA approves the SIPs, they become 
enforceable as federal law.  Id. § 7413.  If the EPA finds that 
a SIP is inadequate to attain or maintain a NAAQS or 
otherwise does not comply with the Clean Air Act, the EPA 
issues a ―SIP call‖ requiring the state to submit a revised SIP 
to correct the inadequacies.  Id. § 7410(k)(5).  The EPA may 
also promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (―FIP‖) to 
establish direct federal controls on sources of air pollution if 
the EPA disapproves a SIP in whole or in part, or finds that a 
                                            
2 After the promulgation of a new or revised NAAQS, the 
EPA designates a list of areas in each state that are in 
―nonattainment,‖ ―attainment,‖ or ―unclassifiable‖ with the 
NAAQS.  42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(B).  An area designated as 
in ―nonattainment‖ is one ―that does not meet (or contributes 
to ambient air quality in a nearby area that does not meet)‖ 
the NAAQS for the pollutant.  Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i).   An 
area in ―attainment‖ meets the NAAQS for the pollutant.  Id. 
§ 7407(d)(1)(A)(ii).  An area designated as ―unclassifiable‖ is 
one that ―cannot be classified on the basis of available 
information as meeting or not meeting‖ the NAAQS for the 
pollutant.  Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(iii).   
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state has failed to submit either a SIP or SIP revision.  Id. § 
7410(c).   
 
Section 126(b) of the Clean Air Act allows downwind 
states to petition the EPA for a finding that a source in an 
upwind state affects the petitioning state‘s attainment or 
maintenance of NAAQS due to air pollution emanating from 
the source in the upwind state.  See id. § 7426(b).  Section 
126(b) of the Clean Air Act provides:   
 
Any State or political subdivision may petition 
the [EPA] for a finding that any major source or 
group of stationary sources emits or would emit 
any air pollutant in violation of the prohibition 
of section 7410(a)(2)(D)(ii)3 of this title or this 
section. Within 60 days after receipt of any 
petition under this subsection and after public 
hearing, the [EPA] shall make such a finding or 
deny the petition. 
Id.  
                                            
3 The cross-reference to ―section 7410(a)(2)(D)(ii)‖ in Section 
126(b) has been determined to be a scrivener‘s error and the 
correct cross-reference in this provision is to Section 
7410(a)(2)(D)(i) of the Clean Air Act.  See Appalachian 
Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1040-44 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
We agree with this determination, and the parties do not 
dispute it.  Accordingly, we will refer to Section 126(b) of the 
Clean Air Act as referencing Section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) of the 
Clean Air Act.   
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In turn, Section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i), also known as the 
―good neighbor provision,‖ prohibits sources or emissions 
activity within a state from emitting air pollutants in amounts 
that will: 
 
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or 
interfere with maintenance by, any other State with 
respect to any such national primary or secondary 
ambient air quality standard, or 
(II) interfere with measures required to be included in 
the applicable implementation plan for any other State 
. . . to prevent significant deterioration of air quality or 
to protect visibility. 
 
Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).   
 
 If the EPA finds, pursuant to a Section 126(b) petition, 
that the upwind state is violating the good neighbor provision 
of the Clean Air Act, the polluting source must cease 
operations within three months of the EPA‘s finding.  Id. § 
7426(c).  The EPA may, however, allow the source to 
continue operations beyond three months if the source 
―complies with such emission limitations and compliance 
schedules (containing increments of progress)‖ as the EPA 
deems necessary to reach the compliance requirements.  Id.    
 
B. NAAQS Regulating Sulfur Dioxide 
Emissions 
  
 Sulfur dioxide, or SO2, is a ―highly reactive colorless 
gas‖ that derives mainly from fossil fuel combustion.  Am. 
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Lung Ass‘n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  It 
smells like rotten eggs and causes acid rain at elevated 
concentrations in the air.  Id.  The presence of sulfur dioxide 
in the air creates adverse health effects, especially for people 
with asthma.  Id.  On June 22, 2010, the EPA revised the 
NAAQS that had previously regulated sulfur dioxide 
emissions to enact stricter standards and ensure the continued 
protection of public health with an ―adequate margin of 
safety.‖  Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for 
Sulfur Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,520, 35,521 (June 22, 2010) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 53, 58) (―1-hour SO2 
NAAQS‖).  Specifically, the EPA replaced the 24-hour and 
the annual standards that had been in place with a new short-
term, more stringent standard that sets the level of sulfur 
dioxide emissions at 75 ppb (parts per billion) per the hour.  
Id.  1-hour SO2 NAAQS became effective on August 23, 
2010.  As part of the implementation process of the 1-hour 
SO2 NAAQS, states are required to submit their SIPs by June 
2013 and to achieve attainment, implementation, 
maintenance, and enforcement of the NAAQS by August 
2017.  Id. at 35,577.   
 
C. The New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection’s Section 126(b) 
Petition  
 
On September 17, 2010, the State of New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (the ―NJ 
Department‖) filed a petition under Section 126(b) of the 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b), (the ―Section 126(b) 
petition‖), requesting that the EPA issue an order restricting 
sulfur dioxide emissions from Portland.  Specifically, the NJ 
Department requested that the EPA make a finding that the 
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trans-boundary sulfur dioxide emissions from the nearby 
Portland plant significantly contribute to nonattainment 
and/or interfere with maintenance of the 1-hour SO2 NAAQS 
in New Jersey.  In support of its petition, the NJ Department 
submitted air quality and aerial dispersion modeling analyses4 
to show that emissions from Portland cause violations of the 
1-hour SO2 NAAQS in Warren, Sussex, Morris, and 
Hunterdon Counties in New Jersey.   
 
On April 7, 2011, the EPA published a proposed 
response to the NJ Department‘s Section 126(b) petition, 
finding that sulfur dioxide emissions from Portland violate 
the interstate air pollution transport provisions of the Clean 
Air Act and suggesting emissions limitations and compliance 
schedules to remedy the problem.  See Response to Petition 
from New Jersey Regarding SO2 Emissions from the Portland 
Generating Station, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,662 (Apr. 7, 2011) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (―Proposed Rule‖).  The EPA 
invited public comments on the Proposed Rule and 
                                            
4 Dispersion modeling simulates air pollutant emissions as 
they are carried throughout the atmosphere.  These models 
replicate the conditions of the atmosphere, providing ―an 
estimate of the concentration of pollutants as they travel away 
from an emission source‖ and can be used ―to determine 
whether a new source will adversely impact an area or to 
predict whether the control of an individual source will have a 
beneficial effect.‖  Dispersion Modeling , AIR QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT ONLINE PORTAL, EPA,  
http://www.epa.gov/oaqps001/aqmportal/management/modeli
ng/dispersion.htm (last visited June 19, 2013).   
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announced a public hearing to be held on April 27, 2011 in 
Warren County, New Jersey.  The EPA received numerous 
public comments from inter alia, individuals, government 
officials, environmental groups, the Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Protection, the NJ Department, GenOn, and 
the American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic.  Many 
of these comments favored the Proposed Rule.  The 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
submitted a comment in which it acknowledged that residents 
of Pennsylvania would realize public health and 
environmental benefits from a reduction in sulfur dioxide 
emissions but suggested some alterations to the proposed 
compliance schedule.   
 
On November 7, 2011, the EPA issued its final rule 
granting the NJ Department‘s Section 126(b) petition, which 
finds that Portland‘s sulfur dioxide emissions significantly 
contribute to nonattainment and interfere with maintenance of 
the 1-hour SO2 NAAQS in New Jersey.  See Final Response 
to Petition from New Jersey Regarding SO2 Emissions from 
the Portland Generating Station, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,052, 69,053 
(Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (―Portland 
Rule‖).  The EPA authorized the continued operation of 
Portland but imposed emissions limits and compliance 
schedules to bring Portland into compliance as expeditiously 
as practicable.   
 
The EPA based its finding on a review of the NJ 
Department‘s air quality modeling, its independent 
assessment of the American Meteorological 
Society/Environmental Protection Agency Regulatory Model 
(AERMOD) dispersion modeling, and other highly technical 
analyses.  Portland Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,053.  The 
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Portland Rule requires Portland to reduce its sulfur dioxide 
emissions by approximately 81% at its two coal-fired 
generating units within three years of the rule‘s effective date 
and to adhere to interim sulfur dioxide emissions limits to 
ensure that Portland demonstrates the requisite increments of 
progress towards achieving final compliance.  Portland Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 69,053, 69,064.  
 
GenOn petitioned for our review of the Portland Rule, 
challenging the EPA‘s authority to impose direct regulations 
on Portland before the time that Pennsylvania is required to 
complete its Section 110 SIP process for the 1-hour SO2 
NAAQS.  GenOn contends that this action offends the 
cooperative federalism structure of the Clean Air Act by 
undermining a state‘s power to determine how to achieve air 
control standards.     
 
II.  ANALYSIS    
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, which allows us to review a 
final EPA action that is locally or regionally applicable within 
our Circuit.  42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1); see Harrison v. PPG 
Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 584-94 (1980); W. Penn Power 
Co. v. EPA, 860 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1988).  Because the 
Portland Rule affects a facility located in the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania and its repercussions affect counties in the 
State of New Jersey, we have jurisdiction to review this 
matter.  Although Section L of the Portland Rule, entitled 
―Judicial Review,‖ indicates that petitions for review must be 
filed in the D.C. Circuit, the parties agree that this was noted 
in error.  Jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit is appropriate only 
for specifically enumerated EPA actions and for regulations 
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with national scope or impact.  Id.  The Portland Rule neither 
fits into the enumerated EPA actions nor is of nationwide 
scope or effect that would make jurisdiction in the D.C. 
Circuit proper.     
 
We are asked to consider whether the prohibition 
against transmitting interstate air pollutants that is referenced 
in Section 126(b) relates to emissions limitations that are 
specifically contained in the Section 110 SIP of the upwind 
state or, more generally, to all interstate air pollution.  GenOn 
and the Utility Air Regulatory Group (―UARG‖),5 contending 
the former, view the Section 126(b) petition process as 
expressly linked to the SIP requirement of Section 
110(a)(2)(D)(i), arguing that there can be no valid Section 
126(b) petition until Pennsylvania is afforded an opportunity 
to establish its SIP for the 1-hour SO2 NAAQS and has failed 
to do so.  The EPA, however, agrees with the latter approach, 
claiming that it can make a finding on a Section 126(b) 
petition without regard to the Section 110 SIP process.  
  
We follow the Chevron two-step framework when 
reviewing an administrative agency‘s construction of a 
statute.  Hagans v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 294 
(3d Cir. 2012).  If the statute is clear, we give effect to the 
unambiguous expressed intent of Congress.  De Leon–Ochoa 
v. Att‘y Gen. of U.S., 622 F.3d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).  However, if the statute is 
                                            
5 UARG has submitted an amicus brief in support of GenOn 
as petitioner-intervenor.   
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silent or ambiguous regarding a specific issue, we move to 
step two and give deference to the implementing agency‘s 
reasonable construction of the statute.  Id.   
 
A. Chevron Step One   
We begin by determining whether Congress has 
―unambiguously expressed [its] intent‖ by examining the 
―plain‖ and ―literal‖ language of the statute.  United States v. 
Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations 
omitted).  ―To determine whether the statutory language is 
ambiguous, we must examine ‗the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.‘‖  Rosenberg v. XM 
Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citations 
omitted).  We ―must not be guided by a single sentence or 
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole 
law, and to its object and policy.‖  Prestol Espinal v. Att‘y 
Gen. of U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted).  
 
The operative language of Clean Air Act Section 
126(b) is that a petition under this section may be granted 
when a major source or group of stationary sources emits air 
pollutants ―in violation of the prohibition of section 
7410(a)(2)(D)[(i)].‖ 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b).  The language of 
Section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) states that each SIP for primary or 
secondary NAAQS ―shall contain adequate provisions 
prohibiting . . . emissions activity within the [s]tate from . . . 
contribut[ing] significantly to nonattainment in, or 
interfer[ing] with maintenance by, any other [s]tate‖ with 
respect to such NAAQs or ―interfer[ing] with measures 
required to be included in the applicable [SIP] for any other 
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[s]tate . . . to prevent significant deterioration of air quality or 
to protect visibility.‖ Id.     § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).   
 
While GenOn contends that the ―prohibition‖ refers to 
a violation of an emissions limitation specific to the Section 
110 SIP of the upwind state, its argument fails to take into 
account the entirety of the statutory scheme.  When we 
consider the applicable language of the Clean Air Act in light 
of the overall statute and its interplay with other related 
sections, we conclude that the relevant language of the statute 
is unambiguous.  
    
Section 126(b) contains no temporal limitation on a 
state‘s right to petition the EPA.  This section obligates the 
EPA to grant or deny a Section 126(b) petition ―[w]ithin 60 
days after receipt . . . and after public hearing.‖  Id. § 7426(b).  
This language demonstrates that the EPA must act quickly on 
a Section 126(b) petition—and not wait the potential several 
years that it would take for states to fully adopt SIPs 
implementing new NAAQS.  As the EPA has correctly 
expressed, ―nothing in the statutory language in section 126 
prohibits a downwind state from filing a section 126 petition 
until after an upwind state, in which the source or sources are 
located, has submitted, or is required to submit, a section 
110(a)(2)(D) SIP to the EPA for approval.‖  Portland Rule, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 69,055.  We also agree with the EPA that there is 
no indication anywhere in the text of Section 126 that a 
Section 126(b) petition is conditional upon the initiation or 
completion of the SIP process.  If such a condition were 
present, Section 126(b) petitions could stand still for several 
years until the SIP relating to a new NAAQS is adopted by a 
state, approved by the EPA, and all necessary revisions to it 
have been made.  Such a result violates the statute‘s 
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requirement that the EPA act on Section 126(b) petitions 
within sixty days.   
 
The language of Section 126(c) also supports our view.  
This section provides that it ―shall be a violation of this 
section and the applicable implementation plan in such State . 
. . for any major existing source to operate more than three 
months after such [Section 126(b)] finding has been made 
with respect to it.‖ 42 U.S.C. 7426(c) (emphasis added).  We 
agree with the EPA that the underlined language would serve 
no purpose if we were to adopt GenOn‘s view since there 
would have been no need for Congress to separately state 
under Section 126(c) that a Section 126(b) finding constitutes 
a SIP violation if operation of the polluting source continues.  
―It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a 
statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can 
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant.‖  TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 
534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).   
 
Our conclusion that the language of the statute is 
unambiguous is also supported by the D.C. Circuit‘s 
examination of three specific provisions of Section 126(b) in 
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 
2001).  In Appalachian, several states submitted Section 
126(b) petitions requesting that the EPA regulate sources 
emitting nitrogen oxide that contributed significantly to 
downwind air pollution in those states.  Id. at 1036-37.  The 
EPA ultimately issued a rule under Section 126(b) requiring 
upwind sources to conform to certain emissions limits and 
engage in an emissions trading program.  Id. at 1039.  At the 
time that the EPA issued this rule, the upwind states were also 
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subject to an ongoing Section 110 nitrogen oxide SIP call 
previously issued by the EPA, requiring deadlines by which 
these states had to revise their SIPs to comply with nitrogen 
oxide emissions reductions.  Id. at 1037-38.  Certain 
petitioners contested the EPA‘s Section 126(b) rule and, 
specifically, the EPA‘s interpretation of the interplay between 
Sections 110 and 126(b) of the Clean Air Act.  Id. at 1045-46.  
The petitioners contended that Sections 110 and 126(b) 
prevented the EPA from making any Section 126(b) findings 
while the nitrogen oxide SIP call was ongoing because 
allowing the EPA to act in these circumstances would amount 
to a violation of the ―cooperative federalism‖ structure of the 
Clean Air Act that gives states primary responsibility to 
address interstate transport in the first instance.  Id.  The D.C. 
Circuit rejected this argument.  Recognizing that states indeed 
retain the power under Section 110 to determine how to 
achieve NAAQS and that the EPA may not ―dictate‖ to a state 
a specific means to do so, the D.C. Circuit held that ―this 
principle . . . cannot be absolute in the face of § 126, which 
contemplates that in at least some circumstances the EPA will 
directly regulate sources within a state.‖  Id. at 1046.   
 
The court in Appalachian reasoned that ―three critical 
provisions of § 126 would lose their force if, as the petitioners 
suggest, the lengthened timetable of the nitrogen oxide SIP 
call were to suspend the § 126 process.‖  Id. at 1047.  First, 
Section 126‘s requirement that a source contributing to 
downwind nonattainment may not operate for more than three 
years after such finding would be eliminated if the EPA had 
to wait for completion of the SIP process to make Section 126 
findings.  Id.  The second reason is that Section 126 provides 
for relief independent of any action by the upwind state, while 
a SIP revision requires action from that state.  Id.  Third, 
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relief under Section 126, unlike SIP calls, is independent of 
the discretionary policy preferences of the EPA since it must 
act on a petition within sixty days.  Id.  These provisions 
support our view that the statute unambiguously allows the 
EPA to make a Section 126 finding independently of the 
Section 110 SIP process.   
 
In response to the petitioners‘ argument that the EPA‘s 
construction would effectively deprive Section 110 of its 
force by binding states to emissions limits set by the EPA and 
not by their own SIP, the court in Appalachian responded that 
it has never been suggested that under Section 110, states may 
―develop their plans free of extrinsic legal constraints.‖  Id.  
―SIP development, like any environmental planning process, 
commonly involves decisionmaking subject to various legal 
constraints. That § 126 imposes one such limitation—and it is 
surely not the only independent provision of federal law to do 
so—does not affect a state‘s discretion under § 110.‖  Id.   
 
This line of reasoning supports our conclusion that the 
language of the Clean Air Act regarding the interplay of 
Section 126(b) and Section 110 is unambiguous.  The plain 
language of the relevant portions of the statute and the 
context in which such language is used convey that Congress 
intended Section 126(b) as a means for the EPA to take 
immediate action when downwind states are affected by air 
pollution from upwind sources.  Any other interpretation 
would defeat the underlying objective of the Section 126(b) 
petition process.  For these reasons, we conclude that the 
plain language of the statute is unambiguous and supports the 
EPA‘s issuance of the Portland Rule.   
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Given the novelty of the issue before us, we find it 
appropriate to engage in an ―in the alternative‖ analysis where 
we conduct step two of Chevron to determine whether the 
EPA has reasonably construed the statute.  See Pennsylvania 
Dep‘t of Pub. Welfare v. U.S. Dep‘t. of Health & Human 
Servs., 647 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 2011) (conducting the 
second step of the Chevron analysis even after finding the 
statute unambiguous).  Even if the relevant language of the 
Clean Air Act were deemed ambiguous, we still find that the 
EPA‘s action was proper.   
 
B. Chevron Step Two  
Under step two of the Chevron framework, we 
consider whether the EPA‘s interpretation is reasonable in 
light of the language, policies, and legislative history of the 
Clean Air Act.  United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).  While GenOn and UARG 
argue that the Clean Air Act‘s legislative history emphasizes 
the concept of cooperative federalism, including states‘ 
primary responsibility in implementing regulations 
promulgated by the EPA, this view is not dispositive to our 
determination of reasonableness.  We neither disagree that the 
Clean Air Act is structured on cooperative federalism nor 
seek to minimize the essential role that the states play in this 
process.  Rather, we believe that reliance on the Clean Air 
Act‘s legislative history that promotes the concept of 
cooperative federalism does not assist us in examining the 
rationale behind the enactment of Section 126(b) itself.   
 
Congress enacted Section 126(b) as part of the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977.  Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 
685, § 123 (1977).  In a report accompanying its version of 
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the bill, the House of Representatives recognized that the law 
prior to 1977 had inadequately addressed the problem of 
interstate air pollution and that an effective program must rely 
on the state that actually receives the pollution and has an 
―incentive and need to act.‖  H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 330 
(1977), reprinted in 4 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, at 2797.  The House 
of Representatives report states that Section 126(b) would 
remedy this problem so that any state could petition the EPA 
for a finding that ―any new, modified, or existing stationary 
source in any other [s]tate is (or would be) emitting pollutants 
which cause or contribute to impermissible interstate air 
pollution.‖  Id.  In doing so, the House of Representatives 
acknowledged that the Section 126 mechanism would be a 
separate and alternative method for states to address interstate 
air pollution.  Id. at 331.     
  
[A Section 126] petition process is intended to 
expedite, not delay, resolution of interstate 
pollution conflicts. . . . [T]he committee intends 
to create a second and entirely alternative method 
and basis for preventing and abating interstate 
pollution. The existing provision prohibiting any 
stationary source from causing or contributing to 
air pollution which interferes with timely 
attainment or maintenance or a national ambient 
air standard (or a prevention of significant 
deteriorating or visibility protection plan) in 
another State is retained. A new provision 
prohibiting any source from emitting any 
pollutant after the Administrator has made the 
requisite finding and granted the petition is an 
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independent basis for controlling interstate air 
pollution.   
Id. (emphasis added).  
Additionally, the House of Representatives report 
indicated that an effective program addressing the problem of 
interstate air pollution ―must include a Federal mechanism for 
resolving disputes which cannot be decided through 
cooperation and consultation between the States or persons 
involved.‖  Id. at 330.   
 
A report of the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works accompanying the 1977 Clean Air Act 
amendments similarly explained that the previous structure 
that had been in place to address interstate pollution created a 
disadvantage for states that had stricter air pollution control 
requirements.  S. REP. NO. 95-127, at 42 (1977), reprinted in 
3 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1977, at 1415.  The Senate Committee 
offered the example of the State of Ohio, which, despite being 
ordered by the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act to 
implement a plan to reduce emissions that would interfere 
with air quality standards, had not done so by 1976.  Id. at 41-
42.  This situation caused emissions from plants in Ohio to be 
transported across the Ohio River to West Virginia, which 
was forced to cope with pollution ―not generated by a source 
under its own control; [requiring] more stringent control of 
West Virginia sources to attain the ambient air quality 
standards.‖  Id. at 42.  The Committee concluded:  
 
In the absence of interstate abatement 
procedures, those plants in States with more 
stringent control requirements are at a distinct 
22 
 
economic and competitive disadvantage. 
[Section 126(b)] is intended to equalize the 
positions of the States with respect to interstate 
pollution by making a source at least as 
responsible for polluting another State as it 
would be for polluting its own State.  
 
Id.  
This legislative history demonstrates that Congress 
viewed the Federal government as continuing to play an 
essential role in the fight against interstate pollution despite 
the fact that the states are the primary actors for implementing 
NAAQS and formulating SIPs.  Congress recognized the 
importance of ensuring that the Federal government maintain 
its role in managing interstate air pollution, as the entity that 
―can and must provide the technical information and 
enforcement assistance that States and localities need.‖  Id. at 
10.  Thus, we conclude that Section 126(b) was intended to 
allow the EPA, as a federal regulator, to intervene when states 
fail to adhere to the air pollution control process.  This 
interpretation supports the EPA‘s construction of the statute.   
 
Existing case law also supports the notion that the EPA 
has reasonably construed the statute.  In New York v. EPA, 
852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the D.C. Circuit interpreted a 
Section 126(b) petition to not obligate the EPA to review 
existing SIPs as part of the EPA‘s Section 126(b) 
enforcement process, as the ―language of §126(b) is quite 
specific and focuses on ‗major sources,‘ not the validity of a 
state‘s SIP.‖  Id. at 578.  This case supports the idea that the 
―prohibition‖ referred to in Section 126(b) is not dependent 
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on a standard established in a SIP that has already been 
approved or is in the process of being revised. 
 
 Similarly, in Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 907 
(2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit held that where a state files 
a Section 126(b) petition to challenge a proposed SIP revision 
of a neighboring state, completion of the Section 126(b) 
procedure is ―not a prerequisite to EPA approval‖ of the SIP 
revision.  Although it recognized that Sections 126(b) and 
110 call for the same substantive inquiry, the court held that 
the two provisions are intended to be used in differing 
procedural settings and that one need not be a prerequisite to 
another.  Id. at 907-08.  Although the court also held that 
Section 126(b) ―appears to have been primarily designed as a 
means for resolving interstate pollution disputes in situations 
where [a] SIP is not being revised,‖ id. at 907 (emphasis 
added), we believe that the court was merely stating the 
primary intent of Section 126(b) and not necessarily its full 
scope and extent.   
 
GenOn and UARG rely on EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 570 U.S. __ (2013) for support, where the D.C. 
Circuit found that the EPA had exceeded its authority by 
issuing FIPs without first giving states the opportunity to 
implement the required reductions through SIPs or SIP 
revisions.  Id. at 28-30.  However, far from helping GenOn 
and UARG, language in this case actually supports the EPA‘s 
construction of the statute.  See EME Homer, 696 F. 3d at 34 
(stating that Section 126 is ―a separate provision [from 
Section 110] that explicitly contemplates direct EPA 
regulation of specific sources that generate interstate 
pollution.‖).     
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   The foregoing examination of the Clean Air Act‘s 
legislative history and applicable legal precedent support our 
finding that the EPA‘s construction of the statute is both 
permissible and reasonable so as to merit our deference under 
Chevron.  For these reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review of the Portland Rule.  
 
 
C. The EPA’s Prior Interpretation of Section 
126(b)  
 
GenOn and UARG also argue that the EPA‘s prior 
interpretation of the meaning of the ―prohibition‖ referenced 
in Section 126(b) related to a SIP‘s failure to address 
interstate nonattainment and ran contrary to the EPA‘s current 
position.  GenOn and UARG cite the EPA‘s issuance of a 
final rule in May 1999 governing ozone transport (the ―May 
1999 Rule‖), where the EPA stated that it ―interprets Section 
126 to provide that a source is emitting in violation of the 
prohibition of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i) where the applicable 
SIP fails to prohibit . . . a quantity of emissions from that 
source that [the] EPA has determined contributes significantly 
to nonattainment or interferes with maintenance in a 
downwind state.‖  Findings of Significant Contribution and 
Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of 
Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,250, 
28,272 (May 25, 1999) (emphasis added).   
 
The May 1999 Rule is not necessarily inconsistent 
with the EPA‘s current position.  As part of the Portland 
rulemaking process, the EPA responded to this alleged 
inconsistency by noting that the May 1999 Rule was 
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prompted by an EPA determination that the elimination of 
excessive trans-boundary emissions would be obtained 
through a pending SIP call that was in play.  Unlike the 
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the May 1999 
Rule, there is no guarantee that an imminent SIP submission 
will manage the interstate sulfur dioxide transport problem 
stemming from Portland within the three-year time period 
required by Section 126.  Therefore, immediate action under 
Section 126(b) is warranted in this case because no other 
mechanism, such as a pending SIP call, exists in these 
circumstances that would remedy the Portland problem.  
 
Even if the May 1999 Rule is deemed inconsistent 
with the EPA‘s current interpretation, it does not undermine 
our decision to grant Chevron deference to the EPA‘s action.  
See generally Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996).  
A revised agency interpretation is still worthy of Chevron 
deference because ―[a]n initial agency interpretation is not 
instantly carved in stone and the agency, to engage in 
informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations 
and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.‖  Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991) (internal quotations 
omitted) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64).  The EPA is 
not forever held to its prior interpretations, as the continued 
validity and appropriateness of the agency‘s rules is an 
evolving process.  For these reasons, we hold that the 
existence of a prior conflicting EPA interpretation does not 
have the effect of rendering the agency‘s current construction 
of the statute unreasonable in these circumstances.  
 
D. Whether the Portland Rule is Arbitrary, 
Capricious, or Abusive of the EPA’s 
Discretion    
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 Lastly, GenOn contends that the Portland Rule is 
arbitrary and capricious because it requires a reduction in 
sulfur dioxide emissions at Portland before requiring similar 
reductions from sources in New Jersey and prior to the time 
that SIPs addressing the new NAAQS are required.  GenOn 
argues that it is arbitrary and capricious to require a single 
facility to address out-of-state nonattainment issues before 
other facilities are required to address the same problems.    
 
We review the contents of the EPA‘s Portland Rule to 
determine whether it is ―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.‖  42 
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A); North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 
896, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  This is a narrow standard of 
review in which a court cannot substitute its judgment for that 
of the agency.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983).  In reviewing 
agency action, we must ensure that, in reaching its decision, 
the agency ―examined the relevant data and articulated a 
satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.‖ 
Prometheus Radio Proj. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 389-90 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).  Therefore, our 
review of an administrative agency‘s action is highly 
deferential, especially in the context of reviewing a federal 
agency‘s scientific determinations.  New Jersey Envtl. Fed‘n 
v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm‘n, 645 F.3d 220, 228 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  
 
Here, the Portland Rule was issued pursuant to the 
EPA‘s authority to find that ―any major source or group of 
stationary sources‖ is emitting air pollution that violates 
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interstate pollution controls.  42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (emphasis 
added).  This language clearly dictates that direct federal 
regulation of a single source or facility is justified when the 
EPA makes a Section 126(b) finding.  Once the EPA 
independently determined that Portland was contributing to 
nonattainment and interfering with New Jersey‘s air quality, it 
reasonably abided by the Clean Air Act in enacting the 
Portland Rule to require emissions reductions ―as 
expeditiously as practicable, but in no case later than three 
years after the date of such finding.‖  Id. § 7426(c).  We find 
nothing arbitrary, capricious, or abusive about the EPA‘s 
discretion in imposing emissions reductions on a single 
source like Portland.   
 
Further, we are satisfied after a review of the record 
that the EPA thoroughly examined the relevant scientific data 
and clearly articulated a ―satisfactory explanation for its 
action, including a rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made.‖  Prometheus Radio, 373 F.3d at 
389-90 (internal quotations omitted).  The EPA examined the 
dispersion modeling results that New Jersey submitted with 
its Section 126(b) petition to show that emissions from 
Portland alone caused downwind violations of the 1-hour SO2 
NAAQS in New Jersey.  Portland Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
69,057-59.  The EPA also conducted its own modeling results 
and, in doing so, considered various components such as 
model selection and meteorological data, which supported its 
conclusion that the imposition of emissions limits on Portland 
would address New Jersey‘s nonattainment issues.  Id. at 
69,059-63. The portions of the EPA‘s Portland Rule that 
describe its methodology for the establishment of emissions 
limits and the increments of progress are extensive and well-
documented.  The EPA carefully calculated the emissions 
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reductions that were needed to eliminate Portland‘s 
contribution to nonattainment in New Jersey; the technical 
and economic feasibility of the emissions limits; and the 
appropriateness of imposing interim emissions limits towards 
achieving the final remedy.6  Portland Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
69,063-75. 
 
Moreover, the EPA published a proposed response to 
New Jersey‘s Section 126 petition on April 7, 2011.  
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,662.  The EPA solicited 
and received many public comments, and considered such 
comments during the course of conducting its findings.  The 
EPA‘s responses to these public comments further elaborate 
the underlying technical details and justifications for its final 
plan of action, including the imposition of emission limits and 
the timing required for the changes.  In the final Portland 
Rule, the EPA provided a thorough summary of the 
―significant changes‖ that it made since its initial proposal, 
                                            
6 Section 126(c) of the Clean Air Act gives the EPA authority 
to include ―increments of progress‖ in the emissions 
limitations and compliance schedules required for a source 
subject to a Section 126(b) finding to continue operating 
beyond three months after such finding.  42 U.S.C. § 7426(c).  
Although ―increments of progress‖ is not defined in the 
statute, it can only be interpreted to mean interim measures in 
the context of the emission limitations and compliance 
schedules.  In any event, GenOn offers nothing to undermine 
the reasonableness of this interpretation of ―increments of 
progress.‖  Therefore, it is accorded deference under 
Chevron.  
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demonstrating that it took all suggestions into consideration 
to establish an effective remedy.  Portland Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 
at 69,053. 
 
 Based on the foregoing, the EPA set forth ample 
support that explains its rationale in promulgating the 
Portland Rule, establishing a rational connection between the 
facts that it found and the choice that it made.  For these 
reasons, we hold that the EPA‘s action of promulgating the 
Portland Rule was neither an abuse of discretion nor arbitrary 
or capricious.   
 
III. CONCLUSION  
For the foregoing reasons, we will uphold the EPA‘s 
Portland Rule and deny the petition for review.  We hold that 
it was reasonable for the EPA to interpret Section 126(b) to 
be an independent mechanism for enforcing interstate 
pollution control, thereby giving it authority to promulgate 
the Portland Rule.  We also hold that the contents of the 
Portland Rule are not arbitrary, capricious, or abusive of the 
EPA‘s discretion.   
